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THE NEGOTIATION MODEL OF TENDER
OFFER DEFENSES AND THE DELAWARE
SUPREME COURT
Dale Arthur Oesterlet
During the ten-month period from May 1985 to March 1986,
the Delaware Supreme Court decided four major cases concerning
the propriety of tender offer defenses. Prior to these decisions, the
court had routinely applied the business judgment rule to protect
defensive tactics employed by target managers during tender offer
contests.' In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 2 the first of the four
cases, a crack developed in the shield. Although the court held for
the target managers, it required that any defensive measure "be rea-
sonable in relation to the threat posed" to qualify for protection
under the business judgment rule.3 In the two decisions that fol-
lowed, the court worried the crack but did not widen it.4 The court
held that the defensive tactics employed in each case easily satisfied
the Unocal modification, casting into doubt whether the modification
had any practical effect. However, in the final published decision of
the period, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,5 the
crack became a fissure. The Revlon court ruled against target man-
agers who had used a lock-up option to favor one bidder over an-
other. Revlon unequivocally demonstrated that the traditional,
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1971, M.P.P. 1974,J.D. 1975, Uni-
versity of Michigan. The author thanks ProfessorsJames Henderson andJohn Siliciano
for their thoughtful comments.
I See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). The only significant
issue in cases before May 1985 was who bears the initial burden of proof: Do defendant
managers merit the protection of the business judgment rule only after demonstrating
good faith and reasonable investigation, or do they automatically enjoy such protection
unless the plaintiff proves a lack of good faith or of reasonable investigation? In Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504-05, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964), a case involving
selective stock repurchase by the corporation (greenmail), the court placed the burden
upon the defendant managers, but left open whether the same burden would apply to
other kinds of tender offer defenses. The court resolved this issue in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985), providing that defendant managers
have the initial burden of proof whenever tender offer defenses are involved.
2 493 A.2d 946 (1985).
3 Id. at 955.
4 Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
5 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Court decided Revlon from the bench before it
released the written decision in Polk, issuing a written decision in Revlon after Polk.
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robust version of the business judgment rule would no longer pro-
tect target managers.
The extent to which the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately
will redefine the traditional, robust business judgment rule in the
tender offer context remains to be seen. This robust version of the
rule asks whether corporate managers are disinterested and whether
they have made sufficient investigation for an informed decision. If
both answers are affirmative, the court will usually defer to the exer-
cise of managerial discretion. In Unocal, the court merely purported
to add a third, "reasonableness" requirement to the traditional re-
quirements of disinterestedness and sufficient investigation. 6 This
third requirement, however, completely overwhelms the other two.7
In effect, this new test-that any defensive measures be reasonable
in relation to the threat posed-becomes the sole and complete
standard, and the court should recognize it as such.
However the new test is formulated, the court must develop a
sophisticated theory for determining when a given tender offer de-
fense is in the target corporation's best interests. Because the ro-
bust version of the business judgment rule is inapplicable, the court
can no longer avoid assessing a particular defense's merits by defer-
ring to managers' prerogatives. Instead, the court, not the manag-
ers, must determine whether a defensive mechanism is reasonable
under the circumstances. This development has the officers of Dela-
ware corporations understandably concerned over the prospect of
unpredictable, ad hoc decisions in tender offer cases. 8 Their con-
6 For an application of the traditional, robust version of the business judgment
rule, see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
7 It is unclear whether the Unocal requirement that defensive tactics be "reason-
able in relation to the threat posed," 493 A.2d at 955, is really any different from the
basic "fairness" or "best interest of the corporation" test routinely applied in all conflict
of interest cases when the business judgment rule is inapplicable. In any event, if the
defendants fail the threshold test, they will not meet any residual fairness standard. On
the other hand, if they meet the threshold test, they will not lose under any residual
application of a business judgment standard.
8 The Delaware Supreme Court's reputation for orthodoxy and stability in matters
of corporate law has contributed to the state's popularity as a place of incorporation for
the nation's largest companies. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Refections upon Del-
aware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 670 (1974); Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corpora-
tion Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 284-85 (1976). The court's recent holdings in
tender offer and "squeeze-out" merger cases have weakened this reputation. See, e.g.,
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985) ("(A]ppraisal is
not necessarily a stockholder's sole remedy."); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d
929, 940 (Del. 1985) (holding that previous cases did not abolish Delaware Block valua-
tion method); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983) ("[W]e adopt a
more liberal, less rigid and stylized, approach to the valuation process than has hereto-
fore been permitted by our courts."); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del.
1977) ("[D]efendants cannot meet their fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs simply by rele-
gating them to a statutory appraisal proceeding."). These cases represent the Delaware
court's vacillating responses to criticism aimed at its decision in Stauffer v. Standard
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cerns will persist until the court establishes a sophisticated, worka-
ble distinction between acceptable and unacceptable conduct by
target managers. The first four cases under the Unocal standard
comprise the embryonic stages of such a theory. These initial pro-
nouncements are both hopeful and troublesome.
In this journal's November 1985 issue, I urged that target man-
agers be viewed as the negotiating agents of target shareholders,
and that the agents' performance be assessed accordingly. 9 When
written, the article was at odds with the Delaware court's existing
holdings. The Revlon case appears partially to accept my view, with
some significant restrictions. Moreover, since my earlier piece the
Office of the Chief Economist of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has gathered data that bears directly on the validity of a ne-
gotiation orientation to tender offers.' 0 This comment will first
further elucidate the theory that target managers should be viewed
primarily as negotiating agents for target shareholders, and then
evaluate the current position of the Delaware Supreme Court.
Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962) in the form of a veiled slight by the
United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 n.16
(1977) (possible interpretation of rule lOb-5 "would impose a stricter standard of fiduci-
ary duty than that required by the law of some States"), and by Judge Mansfield's blunt
attack in Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1298 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mans-
field, J., concurring) ("[P]rocedurally the Delaware appraisal route is far inferior to a
federal cause of action in terms of protection for the minority shareholders."), rev'd, 430
U.S. 462 (1977). These cases may affect future incorporation decisions. See, e.g., Prrr-
STON COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT 9-21 (Apr. 7, 1986) (proposal to eliminate dual incor-
poration in Delaware and Virginia in favor of incorporation in Virginia); Honabach,
Domicile: New Virginia Law May Rival Delaware's, I Corp. Couns. Weekly (BNA) 8 (June
18, 1986).
The Delaware legislature is already nullifying some of the effects of the new court
doctrine. 65 Del. Laws 289 (1986) (reducing directors' liability); see also Lewin, Delaware
Law Allows Less Director Liability, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1986, at D1, col. 1 (Delaware law
reduces directors' liability in partial solution to liability problem created by Delaware
courts).
9 Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agentsfor Target Shareholders in Tender Offers:
A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985).
10 See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS ON THE
WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS (1986) [hereinafter POISON PILL EFFECTS]; OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE ECONOMICS OF POISON PILLS (1986) [hereinafter
POISON PILL ECONOMICS]; see also R. Comment & G. Jarrell, Two-Tier Tender Offers:
The Imprisonment of the Free-Riding Shareholder (Mar. 1, 1986) (unpublished manu-
script) (interpreting data collected by SEC). My earlier piece also did not address the
July 1985 study on shark repellent amendments. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC,
SHARK REPELLENTS AND STOCK PRICES: THE EFFECTS OF ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS
SINCE 1980 (1985) [hereinafter SHARK REPELLENTS STUDY].
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I
TARGET MANAGERS AS NEGOTIATING AGENTS FOR
SHAREHOLDERS
A. The Evidence
Robert Comment and Gregg Jarrell circulated their study of
two-tier tender offers in March 1986.11 Their study analyzes data
collected for an earlier study by the Office of the Chief Economist of
the SEC.1 2 The Comment and Jarrell study demonstrates the high
frequency of negotiated tender offers; tender offers in which the
bidder and the target board of directors agree on an acceptable
price. Of the 225 sample tender offers successfully executed be-
tweenJanuary 1981 and December 1984, more than half were nego-
tiated from the start, and four-fifths were ultimately negotiated.1 3
The study found that most any-or-all offers14 were ultimately negoti-
ated; virtually all successful two-tier offers' 5 were ultimately negoti-
ated; and only two-fifths of the pure partial offers 16 were ultimately
negotiated. 17 Moreover, each year the proportion of negotiated
tender offers increased substantially, reaching eighty-eight percent
in 1984.18
The results suggest that the assent of target managers is often
crucial to a tender offer's success, implying that target managers
possess significant bargaining power in dealing with bidders. Man-
agement's method of acquiring this power usually consists of creat-
ing contract rights that are contingent on a change of control and
that would prove onerous to any new controlling interest. The po-
11 R. Comment & G. Jarrell, supra note 10.
12 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE ECONOMICS OF ANY-OR-ALL, PAR-
TIAL, AND Two-TIER TENDER OFFERS (1985) [hereinafter TENDER OFFERS STUDY]
13 R. Comment & G. Jarrell, supra note 10, at 28 (table 2).
14 In an any-or-all tender offer, the bidder offers to buy all tendered shares of the
target, if a minimum number of shares are tendered.
15 A two-tier tender offer combines a partial tender offer with a subsequent cash-
out merger. In a partial tender offer, the bidder sets both a maximum and a minimum
for the number of shares it is willing to purchase. If the number of shares tendered
exceeds the maximum, the Williams Act requires that the tendered shares be prora-
tioned. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). If the number of shares tendered does not meet
the minimum, the bidder need not accept any shares. In a two-tier tender offer, the
partial tender is usually a cash offer, referred to as the "front-end" payment, sufficient to
obtain a controlling interest in the target firm. If the partial tender offer succeeds, the
bidder uses its controlling position in the target to execute a "dean-up" merger with the
target, exchanging its own securities (referred to as the "back-end" payment) for the
outstanding shares of the target.
16 In a pure partial tender offer, the bidder does not announce any intention to
effect a subsequent merger and does not execute a clean-up merger following the suc-
cessful partial offer.
17 R. Comment & G. Jarrell, supra note 10, at 29 (table 3).
18 Id. at 28 (table 2). The percentage of tenders offers that were ultimately negoti-
ated rose from 69% in 1981 to 76% in 1982 to 82% in 1983 to 88% in 1984. Id.
[Vol. 72:117
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tential target may create such contract rights through a stock divi-
dend program (poison pill plan), 19 through an amendment to its
articles of incorporation (shark repellent amendment), 20 or both.21
The plans provide for cancellation, waiver, or redemption of these
rights, but only by the existing board.22 Thus a bidder must negoti-
ate with the target's board, offering terms attractive enough to con-
vince the existing board to cancel, waive, or redeem these
contingent rights.23 Some commentators have harshly criticized
these contingent contract rights for shifting the shareholders' power
to the board, thereby allowing the board to serve its own personal
19 The target distributes preferred stock, stock purchase rights, or note purchase
rights to common shareholders. The preferred stock (termed "poison pill preferred")
carries a right of redemption contingent on a change of control and, in the event of a
second-stage merger, a right of conversion to common stock of the bidder (known as
"flip-over" rights) or the target (known as "flip-in" rights), depending on which entity
survives the merger. "Trigger" provisions typically define "change of control" as either
a tender offer for greater than 30% of the target's common stock, or a private or open
market acquisition of 20% or more of the target's common stock. For an argument that
the market acquisition trigger in such laws is overbroad, see infra note 132. The stock
purchase rights, also contingent on a change of control, grant holders one or more of
the following: the right to acquire more stock in the target (flip-in rights), to redeem
their shares (back-end rights) or, in the event of a second-stage merger, stock in the
bidder (flip-over rights). The redemption and exercise prices so favor the target share-
holder (two or three times the current market value of the securities underlying the
rights) that the bidder cannot afford to trigger either. A note purchase right operates
similarly to a stock purchase right, except that each shareholder receives as a dividend
the right to exchange common stock for a short-term note, again contingent on a change
of control. Potential targets often combine stock purchase rights and note purchase
rights into one plan. Some plans create a special redemption right, exercisable only by
the existing target board, to extinguish the plans at little or no expense either before or
shortly after the triggering event. See generally Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial
and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1964, 1967 (1984)
(describing typical plans); Fleischer & Golden, Poison Pill, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17
(discussion of warrant dividend plans companies may issue in planning against
takeovers).
20 The charter amendments come in a variety of forms, all dependent on a control
change that is not favored by the existing board. Some impose supermajority voting
requirements on second-stage mergers, others give remaining shareholders a right to
redeem stock at favorable prices or a right to a favorable price in a second-stage merger.
21 Indeed, in the SEC study, of the 245 firms adopting poison pills about 65% had
adopted fair price or other strict supermajority requirements to guard against bids struc-
tured to stampede shareholders. PoIsoN PILL EFFECTS, supra note 10, at 3 n.3.
22 For poison pills, the target board's redemption rights in the case of a tender offer
trigger expire upon either announcement of the offer or consummation of a successful
tender. Redemption rights in the case of a private stock acquisition trigger usually ex-
pire 30 days after the triggering event.
23 Courts should invalidate plans which combine a "first trigger" (when a relatively
small change in stock ownership vests the conversion or redemption rights) with the lack
of a ready mechanism for cancelling the rights once vested. Such a plan does not serve
as a negotiating device, but effectively blocks all offers. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); Amalga-
mated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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interests at the expense of its shareholders. 24
Empirical evidence showing the effect of active negotiating ef-
forts by target. managers on the price of target shares is sparse.
There are numerous instances of the successful use of poison pill
plans to bargain for higher prices, 25 but more general studies are
equivocal. The lack of statistical evidence is understandable; such
studies require concrete, accurate, and easily ascertainable indica-
tors of negotiation behavior. Such indicators are not readily avail-
able, and approximations may mislead rather than inform.26 Gregg
Jarrell's study on litigious targets suggests that target managers who
do not defeat all control changes, but who resist for a time an out-
standing offer in order to secure a higher bid obtain much higher
24 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond-
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1174-75 (1981). But see, e.g., Herzel, Schmidt
& Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REv. 107
(1980).
25 See Fogg, "Poison Pills" Proliferate Despite Conflicting Rulings, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1986,
at 25, col. 3.
26 Gathering data pertinent to the issue of whether target managers best serve
shareholders by erecting defenses to front-end loaded offers is a difficult task because so
much depends on the facts of each case. Rather than conducting a refined, fact-sensitive
analysis, the Comment andJarrell study bluntly compares negotiated and hostile tender
offers. The comparisons, although incapable of providing solid answers, are intriguing
nonetheless.
Analyzing aggregate premiums associated with two-tiered offers, the study demon-
strates that total premiums paid in negotiated offers slightly exceeded total premiums
paid in hostile offers. R. Comment & G. Jarrell, supra note 10, at 33 (table 7). If the
bidder and target negotiated the initial offer, the ultimate average blended premium was
59.3% over market value; if the initial offer was hostile, target shareholders received an
average blended premium of 51.1%. Id. If the subsequent executed tender offer was
negotiated, the average blended premium was 55.5%; if the executed tender offer was
hostile, target shareholders received an average blended premium of 51.2%. Id. This
suggests that target boards negotiate better offers in response to two-tier tender offers
than their shareholders would otherwise receive. Indeed, because it is safe to assume
that target managers are not totally passive during unnegotiated offers (and that they
may have positively affected the price), the data may understate this conclusion.
On the other hand, premiums paid in negotiated pure partial tender offers were
significantly lower than those paid in hostile tender offers of the same type. The average
premium paid in pure partial offers was 14.5% for negotiated initial offers, 42.2% for
unnegotiated initial offers and 19.7% and 22.2%, respectively for executed negotiated
and unnegotiated offers. Id. This suggests that target managers negotiated poorer
deals in response to partial tender offers than the shareholders would have otherwise
received absent target manager intervention. Moreover, because the negotiated pure
partial offers resulted in acquisition of a much larger percentage of total shares (45.9%)
than in unnegotiated pure partial offers (30.1%), id. at 36 (table 10), one would expect
the prices in the former to be higher than the latter.
Again, however, the lack of knowledge of the extent of the managers' roles in un-
negotiated offers weakens this inference. Moreover, the sample lumps tender offers for
minority control blocks together with offers for significant but noncontrolling interests,
two very different phenomena.
122 [Vol. 72:117
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tender offer premiums for their shareholders. 27
On the other hand, the SEC Chief Economist's studies on
poison pill plans and on shark repellent amendments suggest other-
wise. The studies on poison pill plans found, on average, either a
neutral or a slightly negative effect on stock prices when firms an-
nounced the creation of poison pill plans.28 Both studies exhibit
methodological weaknesses common to most studies employing a
cumulative abnormal return analysis. Interpretation of the results
depends on the selection of an appropriate measurement period,
and this is an inexact art.29 More important, such studies do not
necessarily prove that poison pill plans are inherently bad, but per-
haps only that the courts have been too permissive in monitoring
their actual use, allowing target managers to defeat takeover at-
tempts rather than to bargain with potential purchasers. Indeed,
the second SEC study suggests that target managers too frequently
use the plans to block any sale of their company.30
The study on 649 proposed shark repellent amendments simi-
larly found, on average, either a neutral or a slightly negative effect
on stock prices when firms adopted the charter amendments.3 1 In-
terestingly, the pure supermajority amendments had no effect; the
supermajority amendments that allowed a board waiver had nega-
tive effects; and supermajority amendments with board waivers and
27 Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28
J.L. & ECON. 151 (1985).
28 POISON PILL EFFECTS, supra note 10, at 29 & table 5 (1986) (decline in stock
prices of 245 firms averaged .22% over two-day period surrounding announcement of
plan's adoption); POISON PILLS ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 11 & table 1 (decline in
stock prices of 32 companies averaged nonstatistically significant .93%).
The latest SEC study found, however, that in cases subject to takeover speculation,
stock prices declined on average 1.74% over the two-day period surrounding announce-
ment of the plan's adoption. See POISON PILL EFFECTS, supra note 10, at 30 & table 9.
29 See R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUIsFrIoNs 235-38
(1986). Do the results suggest poison pill plans are too weak or too strong as defensive
devices? For example, suppose that some of the firms in the study had signaled, long
before the announcement of the poison pill plans, a general inclination to protect their
shareholders from coercive offers. In sum, the announcement date of the poison pill
plans may not be an appropriate date for measuring whether a defensive program helps
or hurts target shareholders.
30 In 30 control contests, 46% of the targets remained independent, primarily be-
cause of the effectiveness of their poison pill plans. POISON PILL EFFECTS, supra note 10,
at 41 & table 2. These companies experienced, on average, stock price decreases of
17%. Id. at 41 & table 3. Those companies that did use poison pill plans to stimulate
auctions gained, on average, 14% in stock returns over those returns attributable to the
initial bid. Id. at 41 & table 4. Moreover, the study found, id. at 41-42 & table 10, that
target managers used the plans to block any-or-all offers more frequently than the more
coercive two-tier tender offers. See infra note 46.
31 SHARK REPELLENTS STUDY, supra note 10.
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conditioned on a price (fair price amendments) had no effect.3 2
Again, because courts have deferred too broadly to board negotiat-
ing behavior, thus permitting both proper and improper behavior,
the study may measure not the advantages of empowering negotiat-
ing agents but instead the quality of existing legal doctrine. Indeed,
the neutral effect of the more circumscribed delegation of negotiat-
ing power to the board in the context of fair price amendments as
compared with the negative effect of an open-ended delegation of
waiver authority implies that some control of the board's authority is
needed. Because a full and sensible detailing of proper board be-
havior is beyond the capacity of those who draft amendments to cor-
porate articles the optimal solution would seem to be an evolving
common law that restrains board discretion.
B. The Theory
The question of how to evaluate the defensive tactics of target
managers hinges upon whether target shareholders need to rely on
bargaining agents to respond to tender offers. If target sharehold-
ers need no such representation, then target managers should not
interfere. But if target shareholders can gain an advantage through
the use of an agent, their needs define both when and how target
managers should act on their'behalf.
Two arguments support an active role for target managers.
The first, applicable to all tender offers, says that target managers
know more than shareholders about their company's value and
therefore can better assess pending offers. The second argument
relates to front-end loaded tender offers (which could take the form
of an any-or-all, two-tier, or pure partial tender offer), and holds
that if the tender offer succeeds, shareholders who tender are better
off than shareholders who do not; thus, the fear of being the only
nontendering shareholder in a successful tender offer coerces share-
holders to tender when they would rather not. I will consider each
argument in turn.
The strongest statement of the first argument is that target
managers know more than shareholders about their company's
value. Target managers, backed by retained financial experts, re-
peatedly claim that their company's worth exceeds market price, and
courts listen.33 (A variation of the same claim occurs when target
32 Id. at 5 & table 4. Usually, the price upon which amendment is conditioned is the
tender offer price.
33 See A.B.A. Comm. on Corp. Laws, Guidelines for Directors: Planning for and Respond-
ing to Unsolicited Tender Offers, 41 Bus. LAw. 209, 218 (1985) (in responding to tender
offer, board should consider, among other things, liquidation and breakup values of
corporation and its prospects as going concern over next several years). One of the
worst examples is GAF Corp. v. Uiion Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y.
124 [Vol. 72:117
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managers assert that the market overvalues the securities offered by
a bidder in an exchange offer.3 4 ) If these claims are based on public
information, they fly in the face of the efficient market theory widely
held by academics. This theory holds that a corporation's share
price is the most accurate measure of the company's future pros-
pects at that moment.3 5 The most widely-held version of this the-
ory, the "semi-strong" thesis, is that share price reflects all public
information on the company and its milieu,36 and that investors re-
lying on public information alone will not consistently earn above
normal rates of return.3 7 On the other hand, if the claim of manager
superiority is in fact based on inside information,38 the best solution
may not be managerial control or a tender offer defense, but disclo-
sure to shareholders of managers' opinions on the company's
worth. Fully informed shareholders can then decide for themselves
whether to tender. Some commentators have urged that the law
limit manager participation to such a role.3 9
A weaker version of the argument has more validity. In the heat
of a tender offer, some information is extremely difficult to commu-
nicate to shareholders in a timely fashion. Target managers tend to
fear public disclosure, which can destroy the value of confidential
information. One such type of information relates to the company's
ongoing business: a mineral discovery on land for which the com-
1985). In this case, Union Carbide argued that GAF's tender offer, at a substantial pre-
mium over market price, would "after paying off its acquisition indebtedness through a
substantial liquidation, result in a virtual gift to GAF of Carbide's valuable industrial gas
and chemicals and plastics businesses, because GAF would acquire them at no cost." Id.
at 1020. The court accepted this assertion without comment.
34 See A.B.A. Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 33, at 218 (target board should
consider value of noncash consideration). A weaker form of this position may have
some validity. Target managers may obtain information during a partial tender offer
that identifies the bidder as a "looter" who will breach promises to remaining sharehold-
ers or otherwise mistreat them. Id. (target board should consider impact on remaining
shareholders). The issues are whether disclosure of this information by the target board
is a sufficient remedy and, if not, whether sufficient protection is created solely by share-
holder suits.
35 Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549-
51, 554-55 (1984). The "weak" form of the thesis, known originally as the "random
walk" theory, is that price trends do not reliably predict future prices. The "semi-
strong" form of the thesis maintains that share price reflects all publicly available infor-
mation. The "strong" form holds that share price reflects both inside and public
information.
36 Id. at 551. But see Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 341 (1986) (noting wide support, but little empirical evidence, for
semi-strong thesis).
37 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 35, at 569-79.
38 Arguably, false classification of information affecting market price may explain
claims allegedly based on inside information.
39 E.g., Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 865-67 (1981).
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pany owns only exploration rights, or a new product likely to spawn
imitations soon after it is announced.40 In addition, the tender offer
itself often generates inside information relating to bargaining
among tender offer participants, information which was obtained in
confidence or which would adversely affect the target if disclosed.41
Sanitized disclosures that merely allude to the information's exist-
ence may suffice in certain circumstances, but such stopgap disclo-
sure measures are of limited use to shareholders and do not fully
address the more basic criticism that divulging inside information
often damages the interests of both the target and its shareholders.
Even in a weak form, however, this argument provides only lim-
ited justification for target management responses, and may too eas-
ily conceal target manager selfishness. Arguments based on
confidential information are always easy to make, and, unless inves-
tigated on a case-by-case basis, serve only to insulate target manag-
ers from accountability. Such a case-by-case evaluation would be
costly and a broader rule disfavoring the arguments based on confi-
dential information may prove the more prudent choice.
The second argument, which states that front-end loaded
tender offers are inherently coercive, has many proponents.42 In-
deed, the debate in some quarters is not over whether coercion ex-
ists, but rather whether this aspect of tender offers is desirable. 43
This coercion exemplifies the classic prisoner's dilemma.44 In a
40 This argument assumes that the stock's market price would be higher if the pub-
lic knew of confidential information. Of course, this assumption fails where significant
insider trading on the basis of such information raises the stock price.
41 For example, target managers often solicit bargain-specific information from ex-
isting or prospective bidders on the condition that such disclosures remain confidential.
42 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Take-
overs, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1693 (1985); Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. (U. CH.) 345, 352-56 (1980); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair
Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297, 336-40 (1974); Carney,
Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary
Duties, 1983 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 341, 348-49; Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of
Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 676-81 (1984); Oes-
terle, supra note 9, at 56-63. The coercive structure of tender offers can be duplicated in
privately negotiated purchases that lie on the fringes of the tender offer definition. See
infra note 132.
43 The debate between those who would preclude target managers from respond-
ing at all, as well as repeal most of the Williams Act's protections, and those who believe
that some defensive measures are justified is summarized in Oesterle, supra note 9.
Those in the former camp favor tender offers to discipline managers and argue that
target manager resistance dissipates potential gains of the successful bidder, thereby
reducing the incentive to make an initial bid (or engage in the often costly search for
potential targets). In response, I noted that disabling target managers from representing
shareholders will simply drive shareholders to less efficient methods of consolidating
bargaining power; bidders will have no greater incentive to bid, and target shareholders
will incur higher transaction costs in fashioning collective response devices. Id. at 75-8 1.
44 In the classic prisoner's dilemma, prisoners A and B are arrested for the same
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front-end loaded tender offer, the initial offer's value is substantially
greater than that which nontendering shareholders can expect to re-
ceive if the offer succeeds. Even a shareholder who is convinced
that the initial premium is too low will tender for fear that other,
similarly fearful shareholders will tender leaving her, if the takeover
succeeds, with the inferior back-end position of a nontendering
shareholder. 45 The greater the difference between the front-end
premium and the back-end position, the greater the potential cost to
nontendering shareholders. 46 Thus, a tender offer could succeed
crime. The district attorney approaches each separately with the same pitch. He has a
strong enough case to send them both to jail for a year, but if one confesses, the confess-
ing prisoner will serve three months and the other 10 years. If both confess, they will
both serve five years. The prisoners' inability to coordinate responses, coupled with the
compulsion to protect their own interests, compels both to confess. Carney, supra note
42, at 349 n.39.
45 Comment andJarrell found that the mean difference between the front-end and
back-end values was 3.6% for any-or-all tender offers, 17.3% for two-tier offers, and
24.3% for pure partial offers. R. Comment & G. Jarrell, supra note 10, at 35 (table 9).
46 Comment and Jarrell conclude that the SEC data does not support the existence
of a coercive effect in partial tender offers. Id. at 22-23. Their conclusion stems primar-
ily from two findings, both based upon a comparison of any-or-all tender offers with
partial tender offers. The study, however, suffers from a basic mischaracterization of
front-end loaded tender offers. As the authors recognize, even an any-or-all offer can
take the form of a front-end loaded offer operating similarly to a partial offer. Id. at 2. If
the offeror in an any-or-all tender offer states publicly that the offer price will not be
available to any nontendering shareholders, then individual shareholders will tender
even though they would hold out for a higher price if acting collectively. Indeed, if an
any-or-all tender offer does not have some degree of front-end, back-end discrepancy in
value, individual shareholders may decide not to tender in order to free ride on the
tenders of others, with the result that the offer itself may fail. All tenders offers must
have some "coercive" effect to overcome the free rider problem. Thus, separating any-
or-all offers from partial offers does not distinguish nonfront-end loaded tender offers
from front-end loaded offers. The potential for front-end loading is greater in partial
tender offers, but the study fails to indicate whether this was true of the sample.
Moreover, even if the dichotomy established in the study were accurate, the study's
findings may not support its conclusion. First, the authors argue that two-tier offers are
not more coercive because the average percentage of total target shares tendered in
response to a tender offer was higher in any-or-all offers (74%) than in either two-tier
offers (61.6%) or pure partial offers (35%). Id. at 36 (table 10). The figures on unnego-
tiated offers, those unsupported by target managers, were lower but in the same order
by type of offer: 58.4% for any-or-all tender offers; 50.2% for two-tier offers, and
23.7% for pure partial offers. Id. This result is better explained, however, by focusing
on the relative average size of the companies in the sample. Within the set of sample
companies, targets of two-tier offers were, on average, much larger than targets of pure
partial offers, and targets of pure partial offers were, on average, larger than targets of
any-of-all offers. Larger size suggests a more diffuse ownership base, which in turn im-
plies that, all other things being equal, target shareholders will tender a lower percent-
age of shares. Moreover, any-or-all offers typically seek more shares than partial offers;
hence, the higher cost of the last marginal share could explain the higher premium.
Second, the authors noted in support of their argument that two-tier offers are not
coercive that in 18 multiple-bidder contests occurring during the sample period, there
was no evidence that unnegotiated partial tender offers dominated any-or-all tender of-
fers. With only two exceptions, the offer with the highest blended premium prevailed.
Id. at 23. This finding begs the question, however, for acts of target managers could
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
even if over fifty percent of target shareholders believe the price too
lOW.4 7
Perfect competition between bidders should, in theory, elimi-
nate the coercive nature of front-end loaded tender offers. Once
competing bidders reach the absolute lower limit on back-end value,
they will compete on the front-end price, raising the total blended
premium. In actual practice, however, back-end value is never cer-
tain. The residual price of the nontendered stock (or its substitute if
a back-end merger follows the tender offer) is highly speculative 48
because of market uncertainty and other factors, such as predictions
about court decisions on appraisal rights. As a result, two different
bidders rarely offer equivalent back-end positions to the same target
shareholders (each offering, for example, a back-end exchange of an
equivalent value of its own securities for target stock). Even if they
did, shareholders would still face the task of evaluating whether
have caused this result. It is necessary to investigate each case to determine if target
managers acted to neutralize the advantages of a partial offer over an any-or-all offer.
But see AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,942 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 1986) (partial self-tender has unfair advantage over
two-tier, nonfront-end loaded tender, in which outside bidder promises to pay same
price for shares acquired by tender or by second-stage merger).
47 Professor Bradley argues that in principle a partial tender offer can succeed with
a negative blended price. In other words, a partial tender can induce an inefficient
transfer of a company to a lower valued user. Bradley, supra note 42, at 354-56. See also
Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1377, 1412-17
(1986) (prisoner's dilemma ensures success of bidding firm's offer). Such cases will be
rare, however. I have yet to see a description of an actual successful tender offer of this
type.
Proposals to limit the use of certain defensive tactics often overlook the fact that
even though the blended price exceeds the total pre-offer value of the target shares,
shareholders are denied the chance to bargain for further price increases. See Oesterle,
supra note 9, at 80-81 (describing black-market behavior created by this approach). For
example, Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig propose limiting the use of defensive self-
tender offers. These limits are designed to allow self-tender offers only to combat ineffi-
cient takeovers. This approach would not allow target managers to use defensive self-
tender offers as a bargaining device whenever the bidder offers a blended price exceed-
ing the pre-offer value of the target shares.
Other commentators merely question how target shareholders selling above pre-
announcement market price can be injured. E.g., R. GILSON, supra note 29, at 763-64.
Either shareholders systematically undervalue company worth or they should be happy
with any increase over market price. Neither statement is accurate. Once a special bid-
der appears with the potential for creating gains from the merger of the two companies,
the issue becomes how the two parties will divide the gains. Target shareholders should
be allowed to maximize their slice of the gain, even if over pre-announcement market
prices. Legal rules that attempt to block target shareholders' ability to do so will inevita-
bly create inefficient black-market behavior designed to extract true value. Moreover,
rules that successfully block target shareholders from bargaining effectively will discour-
age potential targets from becoming more attractive takeover targets, from searching for
bidders, and from spending resources to find optimal new combinations.
48 See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 92,942, at 94,601 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 1986) (conflicting testimony over back-end
value after partial self-tender offer).
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both offers are reasonable. Although bidder competition benefits
shareholders, some residual effect of the prisoner's dilemma could
conceivably lead target shareholders to tender to the lower
bidder.49
The best solution for target shareholders is, of course, collu-
sion. An organized refusal to tender to the lower offer breaks the
dilemma. Target shareholders should collectively spend on collu-
sion until the marginal losses from front-end loaded tender offers
are equal to the marginal costs of further organization. The more
efficient the method of this organization, the lower the losses from
front-end loaded offers. Of the types of collusion available, simulta-
neous shareholder voting carries substantial administrative costs, 50
and pure shark repellent provisions in corporate charters are too
inflexible.5 1 The most workable method and the one seemingly
most often chosen by corporations, is to delegate negotiation re-
sponsibility to management. Target managers are ideally situated
to consolidate shareholder power, permitting the collusion which
generates the largest possible total blended premium. Through the
creation of, among other devices, revocable poison pill plans and
49 Consider, for example, the case in which the bidder willing to pay the highest
blended premium misjudges court appraisal rights and therefore overestimates the min-
imum back-end merger price.
50 Bebchuk's thoughtful proposal would eliminate much of the administrative cost
of a traditional shareholder vote. Bebchuk, supra note 42, at 1747-64. He suggests that
the target corporation ask its shareholders to vote in the letter of transmittal which must
accompany all tendered shares. A bidder failing to obtain a majority vote may not ac-
cept any tendered shares, even if the number of shares tendered conforms to the offer's
terms. In other words, shareholders could vote to reject the offer even though they
tender their shares. The proposal borrows from several state takeover statutes that
codified similar voting requirements but fell, for the most part, to constitutional chal-
lenges. See, e.g., Illinois Business Take-Over Act, 1978 Ill. Laws 80-1421 (declared un-
constitutional by Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (repealed 1983)).
The proposal has merit, but I am not sanguine about its effects. A substantial
number of shareholders will not make the effort to gather enough information to make
the kind of sophisticated independent evaluation necessary to separate their voting deci-
sion from their tendering decision. Many will have an individual stake too small to jus-
tify research costs, and even those with larger stakes may prefer to sit back and hope to
"free ride" on others' research. Of the few major players who will speak publicly on a
tender offer's merits, target managers are likely to wield the greatest influence.
For this reason, the ultimate effect of Bebchuk's proposal may simply be a consoli-
dation of power in the hands of target managers. The SEC study indicates that target
manager recommendations have significant impact on shareholder decisions; negative
recommendations seem to cause many shareholders not to tender, even when tendering
is in their best interest and the tender offer is front-end loaded. TENDER OFFERS STUDY,
supra note 12, at 22. Bebchuk's proposal would eliminate some pressure to not follow
target manager recommendations.
51 Pure shark repellent provisions consist of amendments to corporate charters that
impede any second-stage merger, making the target a less attractive takeover candidate.
Some amendments require supermajority approval (sometimes up to 957o) for any sec-
ond-stage merger, and are not easily waived or removed. See SHARK REPELLANT STUDY,
supra note 10.
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waivable supermajority vote provisions, target managers can effec-
tively and efficiently maximize the ultimate tender price.
Target managers can therefore play a role in tender offers, pri-
marily depending on whether and to what extent the offer is front-
end loaded. The more heavily front-ended loaded the offer, the less
likely shareholders are free to tender based on their independent
valuations of the sufficiency of the offer price. Because partial
tender offers are more likely than any-or-all tender offers to be
heavily front-end loaded, management responses to the former
should be less intrusive than to the latter.52 In any event, there ex-
ists a very real danger that target managers may use the occasion of
a tender offer to further their own interests at shareholder expense.
Selfish behavior by target management may arise in two contexts: it
can block tender offers that should be encouraged and it can en-
courage tender offers that should be resisted.
Blocking behavior takes two forms: first, management may im-
properly erect a complete defense to block a tender offer; and sec-
ond, management may misuse the negotiation power granted them
through an otherwise sensible program. 53 One obvious reason why
target managers may seek to block a tender offer is the fear of losing
their jobs and salaries. A more subtle incentive to obstruct derives
from the desire to reduce unsystematic risk. While shareholders can
nullify the unsystematic risks of investing in a potential target by
diversifying their stock portfolios, the human capital investment of
managers cannot be diversified. 54 As a consequence, managers may
choose to run a firm more conservatively than is in the shareholders'
best interests. A program of resisting tender offers protects manag-
ers' ability to substantially reduce unsystematic risk. Indeed, the
program itself may reduce such risk by taking the firm out of the
52 Comment and Jarrell found, for example, that average blended premiums ulti-
mately received in negotiated any-or-all tender offers were 51.9% for negotiated initial
offers and 56.4% for negotiated executed offers. The same figures for unnegotiated
any-or-all tender offers were 67.7% and 71.8% respectively. R. Comment & G. Jarrell,
supra note 10, at 33 (table 7). One could infer from the data that intervention by target
managers in any-or-all tender offers may have more costs than gains. Yet, active inter-
vention by target managers during hostile takeover battles is often very rigorous, and
the intensity of their negotiation positions may explain why the prices in unnegotiated
takeovers are higher. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evi-
dence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
53 Compare Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.) (invalid
plan), prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) with Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus.,
Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (refusal to negotiate). See infra notes 77-87 and
accompanying text.
54 See Beck & Zorn, Managerial Incentives in a Stock Market Economy, 37 J. FIN. 1151
(1982).
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takeover market.55
The refusal of managers to negotiate on behalf of shareholders,
on the other hand, may also breach their obligations. The prospect
of one-time personal gain (usually in the form of a bribe from the
potential acquiror) may induce management to sell out at too low a
price. 56 Courts should therefore accept the task of evaluating
whether target managers have acted as faithful negotiating agents
whenever plans that empower target managers to act as negotiators
are adopted or exercised.
Simple criteria should guide court analysis. Only the existence
of significant confidential business information or a failed negotia-
tion gambit aimed at securing a higher price justifies a target man-
ager's total defeat of a tender offer. Similarly, only an effort to
induce a higher bid or to neutralize the disadvantage of an any-or-all
tender offer in competition with a front-end loaded tender offerjus-
tifies acts that give one bidder an advantage over another in an
auction.
C. Problems of Implementation
Those troubled by the idea of corporate bargaining mecha-
nisms are unduly concerned about three phenomena. First, the
sheer mechanical complexity of many devices can cause some ob-
servers to focus on a single part of a device that in isolation seems
unfair. In stockholder rights plans, for example, a tender offer that
succeeds without management approval may entitle the shareholder
to double the value of his shares.57 All of the plans have features
that discriminate in some fashion against shares held by the bid-
der.58 At first blush, these may appear questionable-even fraudu-
lent. Yet such an exchange ratio and discrimination against the
55 An investment by a firm in becoming a target is a gamble, but one that, in some
circumstances, a firm ought to take.
56 This form of behavior is classically associated with the final stages of an extended
"prisoner's dilemma" situation. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUrION OF COOPERATION 10-
11, 42-43 (1984); supra note 44 and accompanying text. Professor Williamson has char-
acterized such behavior as "opportunistic" breach of contract. 0. WILLiAMSON, MAR-
KETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTrrRUST IMPLICATIONS 26-30 (1975); see also R.
GILSON, supra note 29, at 579 (discussion of "final period" principle).
57 The most severe plans contain flip-in provisions that give all stockholders other
than the acquiror the right to buy target stock at half-price if an acquiror buys more than
a specified percentage of the target stock. See Fogg, supra note 25, at 26, cols. 1-2
(describing Sea-Land Corporation rights plan).
58 The discrimination takes two basic forms. First, the inchoate rights issued as
dividends on the common stock cannot be transferred until they are vested by a trigger-
ing event. E.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Accordingly, a bidder who acquires stock after the record closing date for the
rights dividend cannot acquire the rights. Second, when the rights vest, by their terms
they can only be exercised by shareholders other than the shareholder who triggers
19861
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bidder are not intended to net windfall gains for existing sharehold-
ers, but to insure that the triggering event-a tender offer without
board approval-will never happen.59 The higher and more abso-
lute the penalty for acquisitions without approval, the less likely that
unapproved acquisitions will occur.
Target boards thus create contingent contract rights that are
designed to serve as deterrents and nothing more.60 Such contin-
gent rights, which are not actually intended to be triggered, pose
difficult enforcement problems for courts. The existence of these
problems represents the best attack on the plans themselves, and
supports their elimination in favor of more direct agency delega-
tions.61 If bidders can trigger the plans and then run to court to
have the onerous effects of the contingent rights enjoined, then the
plans become worthless. 62 Yet courts have proven reluctant to en-
force plans where the plans' stiff residual consequences have been
them-the bidder. E.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229,
1233 (S.D.N.Y 1986).
Some federal district courts interpreting Delaware and New Jersey law have held
that the plans illegally discriminate among shareholders of the same class. Amalgamated
Sugar, 644 F. Supp. at 1234 (New Jersey law); Minstar, 621 F. Supp. at 1258 (same);
Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 409-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Delaware law); Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp.
468, 477-79 (D.NJ. 1985) (New Jersey law). See also Matheson & Norberg, Hostile Share
Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities, 47 U.
Prir. L. REv. 407, 457-72 (1986) (principle of shareholder equality is sufficient basis for
overturning unfair defensive actions). These cases beg the basic issue in favor of a very
superficial analysis based on the equal treatment of shareholders.
The statutes at issue in these cases are intended to protect existing shareholders from
a dilution of their equity position by unilateral board action taking place after the share-
holder has invested. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:9-1(2)(f) (West 1969). The board can-
not unilaterally assign a dividend to all shareholders with last names beginning with A,
for example. The discrimination in poison pills is not of this type, however, because all
shareholders who purchased after the record closing date under the first form knew they
were buying stock without conversion rights and all shareholders under the second form
who triggered the rights knew they would be excluded from exercising such rights.
Thus, these purchasers were not disadvantaged by a change in their positions after they
had purchased their stock. Indeed, if one asks whether the plans discriminated among
shareholders at the time of the rights dividend, the technical answer would be no; the
bidder's acts created the discrimination. Asking whether the plan created the discrimi-
nation or whether the bidders knowingly triggered the discriminatory effects completely
misses the point. The real issue is whether the poison pill plans provide a benefit to
target shareholders.
59 Of course, if target boards could consolidate shareholder bargaining power
through more direct methods, like share transfer restrictions, such complexities could
be avoided. Unfortunately, the law is unclear, if not disabling, on the matter.
60 They are like the doomsday bomb in the movie, "Dr. Strangelove."
61 See infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
62 It is no surprise that the latest SEC study found that discriminatory poison pill
plans, the most severe of such plans, were instrumental in defeating tender offers in
64% of the cases, as compared to defeats in only 31%o of the cases involving straight flip-
over poison pill plans. POISON PILL EFFE Crs, supra note 10, at 25-26 & table 2.
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triggered.63 Courts have not squarely faced the issue: Do they en-
force the severest plans once triggered to deter bidders from gam-
bling that a plan once triggered will be enjoined, or do they act as a
safety valve for triggered plans that disable a firm and encourage
bidders to gamble on court relief? Such uncertainty creates a draft-
ing nightmare. The more severe the contingent rights, the more
likely a judge will act to nullify them once triggered. But the less
severe the contingent rights, the less likely a bidder will find them a
hinderance to unapproved takeovers. 64 So drafters of poison pill
plans must now find the perfect balance: a plan that deters bidders
and that courts will enforce once triggered. An error in either direc-
tion has monstrous consequences.
Most bidders are not currently willing to take the huge gamble
of triggering a plan and then seeking court relief. Rather, they run
to court on the eve of triggering the plan, asking the court to enjoin
the plan or force the target board to redeem, cancel, or waive the
contingent rights. 65 Courts face yet another difficult issue: The bid-
der claims it will go no higher and the target is holding out for
more; should the court force the target to accept the bidder's last
price? If courts too often require targets to accept the bidder's last
price, then bidders will be encouraged to hold out with lower offers
and use courts as a bargaining weapon. But if courts too often re-
fuse to require targets to accept the bidder's last price, either some
beneficial acquisitions will fail and subsequent suits against target
managers will inevitably follow or bidders will try the gamble, trig-
ger the plan, and try to convince a court to grant relief.
What is the optimal enforcement posture of the courts on these
questions? If poison pill plans are allowed at all (and I favor more
direct delegations of negotiation authority), courts should take a
rather harsh approach in order to limit the judicial role in the actual
bargaining, assuming that the plan itself is not a complete block and
therefore infirm but rather is a means of concentrating bargaining
authority in the target managers. If triggered plans are enforced,
then target boards will not have to accept bidders' "final" offer, and
relief will come in the form of after-the-fact damage awards against
target managers. If target managers acted selfishly or if they took a
63 See Amalgamated Sugar Go. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
64 For example, Sir James Goldsmith was able to structure a second-stage merger
transaction that avoided the flip-over effect of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation rights
plan. See Fogg, supra note 25, at 25, col. 3, 26, col. 1.
65 See, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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foolish gamble, then they should be personally liable. 66
Second, devices created without shareholder approval give rise
to the argument that control of the corporation has shifted from
shareholders to managers without shareholder approval, thereby
permitting managers unilaterally to change the basic contract.
Some commentators urge that courts only declare poison pill plans
valid if installed by a shareholder vote. 67 Past practice suggests,
however, that such approval acts merely as a rubber stamp of man-
agement proposals, and penalizes only those managers who, having
waited too long to put a plan in place, vainly attempt to secure
shareholder ratification after a bidder has already made a tender of-
fer. In the end, the debate reduces to whether corporate codes
should presume that shareholders normally favor or oppose giving
their managers the power to create poison pill plans. If knowledgea-
ble shareholders generally favor such plans, then the law should re-
quire a charter amendment to divest managers of the power to
create them; if the plans are generally disfavored, then the codes
should require a charter amendment to vest managers with the
power to create them. In any event, the most effective check on
plans that are ultimately against shareholder interest will come from
the resulting depressed stock prices. The fact that over 190 compa-
nies have poison pills in place 68 suggests that the plans have value
beyond mere entrenchment of target managers.
Third, some observers may feel that courts may not be
equipped to discern selfish behavior by target managers. Skillful
lawyers can usually disguise acts motivated by the self-interest of
target managers. Yet the decision whether to resist is often patently
suspicious; one can easily evaluate both the tender offer price and
the target board's reactions to it. Moreover, the offer's effect on
target managers' personal positions ought to help to determine
whether the managers' acts were intended to be in the best interests
of shareholders. 69 Courts to date hesitate to make even the simplest
66 The one exception is for acts of target managers in responding to an offer that
are clearly motivated by self-interest. Here, a grant of preliminary injunctive relief in
cases brought before the rights have been triggered could avoid compounding the
losses created by such behavior.
67 See, e.g., Note, supra note 19, at 1964 n.2; Note, Internal Transfers of Control Under
Poison Pill Preferred Issuances to Shareholders: Toward a Shareholder Approval Rule, 60 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 94 (1985); Vise, "Bill of Rights" Seeks to Boost Power of Shareholders, Wash.
Post, Apr. 13, 1986, at Fl, col. 1. The SEC has requested comments on the subject. See
infra note 68.
68 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,018, at 88,203 (July 31, 1986). The Commission is requesting comment on possible
regulation of "poison pill" plans, id. at 88,199, implying that it is leaning toward impos-
ing a shareholder approval requirement.
69 Some commentators argue that motives are impossible to distinguish and sort
and therefore should be irrelevant to the inquiry. E.g., Macey & McChesney, A Theoreti-
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investigations of target managers' positions; they refuse to consider
as relevant, for example, evidence that the target managers will be
ousted if the offer succeeds. 70 This hesitation, which defies com-
mon sense, is not evident in standard breach of loyalty cases outside
the context of tender offers. In fact, one study of ninety-five cash
tender offers found that the greater the positive impact of a tender
offer on target managers' personal wealth, the lesser the likelihood
of target management resistance. 71
Some very recent cases illustrate that courts are capable of dis-
cerning selfish behavior. Self-interested behavior is most often ob-
vious in multiple-bidder situations. For example, in Edelman v.
Fruehauf Corp., 72 the target board accepted incumbent manage-
ment's leveraged buy-out proposal without giving the competing
outside bidder a chance to raise its offer. The board then summarily
rejected the outsider's subsequent increased bid.73 To close out the
outsider completely, the board restricted its ability to negotiate with
any other bidder by entering into a no-shop agreement with the in-
vestment bank that was to finance the buy out.74 The board also
amended its stock option plan, incentive plan, and pension plan to
render all company-issued options immediately exercisable, all in-
centive payments immediately due, and the $70 to $100 million of
overfunding in the pension plan, which had been available for cor-
porate uses, irrevocably committed to the fund if anyone, without
board approval, obtained a forty-percent interest in the corpora-
tion. 75 The Sixth Circuit had no difficulty in holding that the
board's
actions were not taken in a good faith effort to negotiate the best
cal Analysis of Corporate Greenmai4 95 YALE LJ. 13, 59 n.168 (1985); see also Gilson, supra
note 39, at 821-31 (courts avoid confronting management conflict of interest). This
approach implicitly rejects the duty of loyalty/duty of care dichotomy of traditional
agency law. I am more sanguine about the courts' ability to determine motive in corpo-
rate cases, just as they do in simple trust, tort, and criminal cases. Moreover, a target
management decision to block a tender offer by a "crown jewel" sale or to pay green-
mail is not that much different from a decision by a chairman of the board to hire his
spouse as president; the inquiry in all these cases ultimately must be whether the share-
holders are better off with one set of managers or another. If courts can handle the
latter case, they can handle the former cases.
70 See, e.g., Grouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 703-04 (2d Cir.
1980) (record "unusually sparse, if not nonexistent" for proposition that retention of
control motivated directors' actions); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp.
1016, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (no inference of self-interest merely where directors' acts to
defeat tender allow them to remain on board).
71 Walkling & Long, Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15
RAND J. ECON. 54 (1984).
72 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
73 Id. at 885.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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deal for the shareholders. They acted as interested parties and
did not treat the [target] managers and the [outside bidder] in an
even handed way but rather gave their colleagues on the Board,
the inside managers, the inside track and accepted their proposal
without fostering a real bidding process. 76
Even in less obvious cases, the necessary inquiry need not delve
into the personal finances of target managers. The very nature of
the defensive plan adopted may be sufficient for courts to conclude
that the target board has breached its duty of loyalty. In Dynamics
Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 77 for example, the target CTS adopted
a "flip-in" rights plan that combined a relatively quick trigger with
effective irreversibility. If an outsider acquired fifteen percent or
more of the corporation's common stock, the rights vested, became
irredeemable, and entitled all shareholders other than the acquiror
to purchase CTS securities at twenty-five percent of market value.
The Seventh Circuit noted, "[I]t is apparent that the insiders on the
board.., decided from the start to block the tender offer, before its
ramifications for shareholder welfare were considered .... 78
CTS restructured the plan in an effort to gain court approval, 79
increasing the triggering threshold to twenty-eight percent, chang-
ing the flip-in consideration to $50 of short-term notes, and provid-
ing a tolling period of 120 days if the acquiror announced an any-or-
all tender offer for more than $50 in cash per share. The rights
could be extinguished if the offer were completed during the tolling
period, or if redeemed by the board at five cents per share.8 0 The
district court, evaluating the revised plan, refused to grant the ac-
quiror's motion for a preliminary injunction and held that the re-
vised plan was not intended as "a mere 'ploy' to get reelected. 81
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the restructured plan also prevented all takeovers.8 2
The court questioned whether the $50 tender offer price necessary
for cancelling the plan was too high in light of an existing market
price of $29 and the bidder's willingness to pay $43.83
Finally, cases exist where the plan itself might pass muster when
promulgated but the target's management misuses the negotiating
76 Id.
77 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
78 794 F.2d. at 257.
79 The district court had previously enjoined the target's original plan. Dynamics
Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
80 Dynamics Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
81 Id. at 1181. The district court, in light of the Seventh Circuit's subsequent writ-
ten decision, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986), examined
and adherred to this conclusion. 638 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
82 Dynamics Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,993 (7th Cir. Nov. 3, 1986).
83 Id. at 94,867-69.
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power given it by the plan. In Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries,
Inc.,84 the board established a more typical and less sensitive trig-
gering event: a market acquisition of twenty percent or an an-
nouncement by the acquiror of a tender offer for thirty percent or
more of the outstanding common shares. Atypically, however, the
rights were not redeemable once triggered by private acquisitions.
Before the trigger had been pulled, a group of outside purchasers
requested that the target board redeem the rights in exchange for
an offered price. The board refused, arguing that the prospective
price offered underestimated the inherent value of the business.
The purchaser group then acquired over twenty percent of the tar-
get's stock. The rights vested and flip-over and flip-in provisions
kicked in to block any attempt at a second-stage merger; the corpo-
ration was effectively locked out of any corporate combinations for
ten years.8 5 The district court, focusing on the finality of the plan
once the rights had vested, 6 granted a preliminary injunction to
prevent its execution,8 7 suggesting that a plan must provide more
lenient opportunities for reversibility and, most significantly, that a
board must negotiate fully and carefully with a potential acquiror
before the last, irreversible triggering event.
An investigation into the personal stake of management may be
unavoidable, however, in cases where target officials "accept" an of-
fer, deciding not to negotiate for a higher price. Such an investiga-
tion might be necessary in order to distinguish decisions motivated
by poor judgment from those prompted by personal greed. In any
event, given the vitality of the duty of loyalty/duty of care dichotomy
in other contexts, courts' historical reluctance to consider the im-
pact of managerial acts during a tender offer on the personal for-
tunes of target managers is curious indeed.88
84 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
85 The rights have a 10-year life. For a complete description of the plan, see id. at
1232-33.
86 Id. at 1236.
87 Id. at 1240.
88 See Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 129 A.2d 242 (Del. Ch.
1957). But see Pupecki v.James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 382 N.E.2d 1030 (1978)
(summary judgment for defendants inappropriate where plaintiff alleged corporation
sold most of its assets for inadequate consideration, with additional consideration di-
verted to majority shareholder for separate employment and noncompetition agree-
ments). This reluctance, in the form of a presumption against selfish actions, is more
understandable in the context of statutory mergers and asset acquisitions, where a
shareholder vote and full disclosure of all factors material to such a vote (such as gener-
ous employment contracts between target managers and the surviving corporation) are
required. See 13B B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS
AND MERGERS § 24.02 (1986) (survey of state statutory requirements). In negotiated
tender offers, however, target shareholders may not be aware of any side deals between
the bidder and target managers when deciding whether to tender their shares.
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II
COMPARING A NEGOTIATION THEORY WITH THE DOCTRINE
OF THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT
A sophisticated theory of tender offer defenses must answer
three related questions. First, whose interests should target manag-
ers represent? Second, when, if ever, should target managers com-
pletely block a tender offer? Third, when, if ever, should target
managers favor one bidder over another? (The answer to the first
question affects the answers to the second and third, and the third is
essentially a subissue of the second.) As noted above, a negotiation
theory responds that target managers should represent sharehold-
ers, that they should rarely completely block a tender offer, and that
they should rarely favor one bidder over another. The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, has given other answers on the first two
questions and, somewhat incongruously, appears to agree with the
answer to the third.
A. Whose Interests Should Target Managers Represent?
The first question breaks down into two subparts: first, should
management decision making balance the demands of all of the cor-
poration's constituencies, or should it favor shareholders?; and sec-
ond, when should corporate managers discriminate among
shareholders? Much scholarly debate has focused on the first is-
sue.8 9 Commentators have asked whether managers should ever
further the interests of creditors, customers, suppliers, or the local
community at the expense of shareholder gain.90 In spite of the
abundant scholarship, corporate law on this issue remains largely
unchanged.
1. Equity Holders Versus All Other Interested Participants
The traditional and still dominant view is that managers repre-
sent the shareholders. Creditors, customers, suppliers, and employ-
ees create and protect their interests through contracts with the
corporation. Specific legislation, such as employee safety require-
89 A succession of disclosures of substantial corporate misconduct during the early
1970s prompted this debate. See Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of Its Directors
and Officersfrom Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 513, 514-16 & 514 n.4 (listing disclo-
sures of illegal political contributions, commercial bribery, huge financial frauds, large
scale environmental abuses, and unsafe consumer products).
90 In many cases, business decisions that account for the interests of one or more of
a corporation's other constituencies maximize the interests of the shareholders as well.
Respecting obligations to creditors, for example, can establish a good credit reputation,
which is normally in the best interests of equity holders. The hard cases, such as tender
offer situations, arise when circumstances indicate that shareholders' interests conflict
with those of the other constituencies.
[Vol. 72:117
TENDER OFFER DEFENSES
ments and consumer protection laws, also enhances their bargain-
ing power. Legal standards of corporate conduct imposed by courts
and legislatures protect constituencies who are not connected to the
corporation, but may be affected by its operations (those who
breathe air affected by corporate emissions, for example). Within
these constraints, managers are charged with pursuing shareholder
interests.9 1
But are tender offers a special case? Some respond that they
are, and the Unocal court seemingly endorsed their position.9 2
Although the position has never been well developed, it provides
self-interested target managers with an endless supply of excuses
for blocking offers that are actually in their shareholders' best
interests.
The position's most powerful form is that tender offers provide
shareholders with an unusual opportunity to disadvantage other
corporate constituencies because the shareholders are exiting the
corporation en masse. Ordinarily, developing and maintaining posi-
tive relationships with the corporation's many constituencies serves
the shareholders' interests. During a tender offer, however, tender-
ing shareholders may seek to maximize their exit payout at the ex-
pense of these other constituencies. 93 Shareholders will leap at a
premium price and transfer control to a bidder even if they realize
91 The only modification of this principle allows managers to make limited dona-
tions of corporate resources for humanitarian, educational, or philanthropic purposes,
without the need to demonstrate a direct benefit to the corporation. Theodora Holding
Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (overall social benefits of gift
outweigh small loss to immediate stockholder interests). See generally Garrett, Corporate
Donations, 22 Bus. LAw. 297 (1967) (tracing evolution of legitimacy of corporate
donations).
92 In Unoca, the Delaware Supreme Court, citing Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover
Responses and Directors' Responsibilities: An Update, 40 Bus. LAw. 1403 (1985), stated that
target managers could consider "the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)."
493 A.2d at 955. Some corporate charters and state statutes expressly sanction board
consideration of employee, supplier, customer, and local community interests. A.B.A.
Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 33, at 218.
93 There is evidence, for example, that bondholders suffer when bidders and
targets incur new debt to finance or fend off takeovers. Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts
Clobber Blue-Chip Bondholders, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 113 (27% of Moody's 134
downgrades of corporate bonds in 1985 resulted from takeover activity); Prokesch,
Merger Wave: How Stock and Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1
("[B]ondholders on both sides [of a takeover] are often big losers."). Stockholders nor-
mally have no incentive to increase bondholders' risks; to do so would affect prices of
future corporate bond issues. Exiting stockholders, on the other hand, care little about
future bond issuances and therefore would probably be indifferent to an increase in
bondholders' risks. Leveraged takeovers, for example, are usually financed by bank
loans secured by target company assets, and by junk bonds payable by the target. The
claim dilution created by the additional debt can severely reduce the old bonds' value.
Prokesch, supra, at D4, col. 2.
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that the new owner will default on corporate obligations to non-
shareholders. 94 Accordingly, it is argued, target managers should
be charged with protecting other constituencies' interests in tender
offers, even at the risk of occasionally frustrating a majority of share-
holders who wish to tender.95
The above argument may accurately describe the motivations of
exiting shareholders, but it ultimately breaks down. First, it incor-
rectly assumes that this exit motivation is unique to tender offers.
Such exit strategy can also occur in a negotiated sale of control
(consummated, for example, through a statutory merger), yet no
one has seriously argued that managers of the acquired corporation
should press creditors' interests over those of shareholders in the
sale. Second, there is no reason to think that the new owners would
be any more likely to abuse the corporation's nonshareholder con-
stituencies than the exiting owners. 96 Third, it is unrealistic to as-
sume that even well-intentioned managers can choose properly
whom to represent, and how vigorously to represent them. Predict-
ing abuse by a bidder is problematic, and fashioning an appropriate
response within the psychological turmoil of a hostile tender offer is
even more so. Finally, the exercise of discretion by target managers
contemporaneous with a tender offer may not be the best method of
protecting these potentially disadvantaged constituencies. Non-
shareholders typically have pre-established legal recourse once
threatened injury becomes a reality; creditors, for example, can sue
on the underlying debt contract.97 The creditors' ultimate protec-
tion is the lending price. Routine abuse at the hands of sharehold-
ers in the context of tender offers will tend to raise interest rates
that corporations have to pay in order to sell their bonds and
notes.98 Consequently, corporations will have an incentive to signal
to bondholders, with adequate guarantees, that they will not disad-
vantage creditors in tender offers.
94 This argument, if valid, still does not support target manager intervention on
behalf of nonshareholder constituencies unless a threat exists that the bidder will breach
existing contractual or legal obligations. Even if a bidder threatens to close down the
local factory and move the facilities to Korea, the economic impact on the community
would not provide target managers with a justification for defending the offer at share-
holder expense.
95 See GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (target board should balance interests of employees and management in respond-
ing to tender offer).
96 Indeed, the new owners, to preserve the company's value, may have an incentive
to monitor the selling owners' exit behavior.
97 One commentator argues, however, that indenture covenants currently do not
provide sufficient protection to bondholders. Directors, therefore, should have a duty to
protect bondholders as well as shareholders. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Govern-
ance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413 (1986).
98 See Prokesch, supra note 93, at D4, col. 2.
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The pigeons came home to roost in Revlon.99 In defense to a
hostile tender offer, the Revlon board executed a self-tender offer,
exchanging senior subordinated notes and preferred stock for com-
mon stock. 00 The newly issued notes contained covenants limiting
Revlon's ability to incur additional debt, sell assets, or pay divi-
dends.' 0 ' This exchange offer served to concentrate stock owner-
ship in friendly hands and the note covenants made the company
very unattractive to potential purchasers. The existing board, how-
ever, could waive the note covenants in order to sell the company.
An auction developed between two bidders and the Revlon board
announced that it would waive the covenants, causing a dramatic
drop in the value of the notes.'0 2 The directors ended the auction
by favoring one bidder with a lock-up option on one of Revlon's
choice assets.' 0 3 In the ensuing suit by the spumed bidder, the Rev-
lon board, citing Unocal, 10 4 justified its actions by pointing out that
the favored bidder promised to protect the injured noteholders.' 0 5
Three factors make the case particularly intriguing. First, the
board that cited concern for noteholders to justify its choice of suit-
ors had itself depressed the value of existing bonds when it created
the new class of subordinated notes. If the board acted reasonably
in protecting new noteholders, then did it not act unreasonably in
failing to protect the old bondholders? Second, the complaining
new noteholders were originally shareholders that had responded to
a board request and recommendation to exchange stock for notes,
and were burned by the board as a result. Thus, the complaining
noteholders had become noteholders precisely because they obedi-
ently complied with the board's recommendation at a time when the
board was subject to a direct fiduciary obligation to them. Third,
the Revlon facts provide a paradigmatic opportunity for exit strategy,
a one-time raid on both the new noteholders (old shareholders) and
old bondholders that would have no adverse effect on the com-
pany's financial reputation because new management would control
the company. Thus, the case's facts provided the court with the
strongest possible case for requiring that the board protect old and
new noteholders from exit behavior that would reward remaining
shareholders.
99 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
100 Eighty-seven percent of the shareholders accepted the offer. Id. at 177.
101 Id.
102 Angry noteholders, who immediately lost close to 13% of the value of their
notes, deluged the directors with irate phone calls. Id. at 178.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 182.
105 The favored bidder agreed to support the par value of the outstanding notes by
an exchange of new notes that would presumably trade at par value once the offer was
consummated. Id. at 178-79.
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The Delaware Supreme Court instead did an about-face. Rather
than respect the Revlon board's efforts to balance noteholder and
shareholder interests, the court held that the board erred even to
consider the noteholders; the board's role was to get its sharehold-
ers the best price. The court modified its Unocal position by adding
the caveat that a board may consider various nonshareholder con-
stituencies "provided there are rationally related benefits accruing
to the stockholders." 10 6 Because the board adhered to the specific
terms of the note covenant, it did not breach any duty of good faith
to the noteholders. 10 7 The court had, in essence, returned to the
traditional rule: The shareholders' interests are primary, and the
board may consider other constituencies' interests only when they
comport with those of the shareholders.
2. Discrimination Among Shareholders: The Bidder Versus All Other
Shareholders or Arbs Versus Long-Term Shareholders
Having decided which interests target managers may consider
in responding to a tender offer, one must now decide whether target
managers may discriminate among their own shareholders. Often,
the bidder, prior to mounting a tender offer, buys a toehold or
beach head in the target through the market. Once a bidder sur-
faces, speculators trade heavily in the suspected target's stock, hop-
ing to turn a quick profit if an acquisition is consummated. May
target managers devise defenses involving stock rights that discrimi-
nate against the stock held by either bidders or speculators?
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a corpora-
tion's repurchase offer in competition with a hostile tender offer
could exclude the bidder's shares.108 The court also implied that
the board could subordinate the interests of speculators to those of
106 Id. at 182-83. This caveat admits of two interpretations. The first is that target
managers must pay primary attention to maximizing share price in an auction; only in
single bidder situations may managers consider nonshareholder interests. More broadly
interpreted, this language suggests that the Unocal standard was too broad, and that
target managers are responsible in all cases for maximizing share price; nonshareholder
interests merit consideration only when their satisfaction would have a positive effect on
share price.
107 Id. The case's true irony is that any suit by noteholders will probably allege that
the Revlon board violated its duties to the tendering shareholders by misrepresenting
the notes' value in its exchange offer. If the plaintiffs succeed, the corporation will have
to pay (either directly or, through indemnification of its directors, indirectly), and the
company's value to the new owners will drop. It makes sense therefore for the new
owners to negotiate a sale that, in essence, settles the lawsuit. Consequently, the law-
suit's settlement value is a factor when considering two outstanding bids. The court's
language on the illegitimacy of the board and favored bidder's deal on the noteholders'
claims therefore seems somewhat overstated.
108 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958-59.
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"longer-term" shareholders. 10 9 The court's approval of the exclu-
sionary exchange offer (known as "reverse greenmail") provoked
substantial criticism, and the SEC promulgated a rule that effectively
overrules this case. This new rule, which became effective July 17,
1986, requires that all tender offers be open to all holders of a par-
ticular class of securities, and requires that the consideration paid to
any security holder equal the highest consideration paid to any
other security holder during the tender offer. 110 The court's com-
ment on the position of speculators, on the other hand, has received
little attention.
Most criticism of exclusionary exchange offers derives from the
belief that all shareholders in a single class merit equal treatment,
regardless of whether the particular discrimination in issue ulti-
mately serves the target shareholders' interests."' The new SEC
rule seems to vindicate this view, but perhaps too unequivocally.
The rule may also signal an attack on discriminatory poison pill
plans' 12 and selective stock repurchases (greenmail). Yet, both
rights plans and the threat of an exclusionary self-tender can often
serve shareholder interests. Both consolidate shareholder bargain-
ing power in the target board when necessary to respond effectively
to a tender offer. Greenmail can also serve a legitimate function by
allowing target managers to buy off unwanted suitors and stimulate
higher subsequent offers." 3
This is not to say that the Unocal court's arguments in favor of
discrimination are completely correct. The court's comment that
target managers can favor long-term shareholders over "specula-
tive" shareholders" 4 is aimed at the "arbs," and has no merit. The
arbs, or arbitrageurs, buy shares in potential takeover targets solely
to profit from the takeover premium-they buy to sell. Target man-
agers view them with considerable disdain because such purchases
109 Id. at 955-56.
110 Amendments to Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,873 (1986) (to be codified at 17 G.F.R. §§ 200, 240).
I1I The principle of shareholder equality creates as many questions as it answers.
Some acts that are ostensibly equal, such as the decision to pay a dividend, may affect
shareholders in different tax brackets unequally. High bracket taxpayers could be out-
voted by low bracket taxpayers in the decision to declare a dividend. Would equalizing
net after-tax gains (by paying dividends that vary with the tax rates of the recipients) be a
more equal treatment of shareholders? Moreover, other acts with unequal effects, such
as selective offerings of newly issued stock, do not violate the rule. The legality of these
acts is not established by the concept of equality, but by the concepts that define the
legitimate exercise of controlling power in the corporate form. See generally Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982).
112 For a discussion of discriminatory poison pill plans, see supra note 58.
113 See Macey & McChesney, supra note 69, at 26 ("ability to pay greenmail thus
increases the probability of a takeover attempt occurring").
114 Unoca, 493 A.2d at 955-56.
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contribute to the upward pressure on the stock price, increasing the
pressure on managers to agree to sell the company. Managers
blocking an offer risk a precipitous decline in stock price as the arbs
cash out, and this decline fuels shareholder litigation. The managers
must then explain in court why their acts were appropriate in spite
of the foreseeable and severe stock decline. Managers, therefore,
often deem arbs second-class stockholders with no real long-term
interest in the company, and argue that arb losses are relatively un-
important. The Delaware Supreme Court, in dicta, seemed to favor
the argument.' 1 5
The court's dicta flies in the face of efficient market theory,
which ignores any distinction between long-term and short-term in-
terests. The trading activity of the arbs, and of any other sharehold-
ers, accurately values the shares consistent with all relevant public
information. Indeed, such activity should theoretically aid target
managers when they decide how best to respond to a tender offer.
If, for example, the market price of a target's shares jumps to a level
exceeding the likely blended premium of a pending partial tender
offer, then it is likely that the bidder has made too low an offer, or
that another higher bidder waits in the wings.
B. When Should Target Managers Block a Bid?
The question of when target managers should block a bid may
arise in two different contexts, and hence may be rephrased as two
separate questions: First, when should target managers block a bid-
der so that the target survives with no major control changes? Sec-
ond, when should target managers block one bidder so that another
can succeed? Of course, the conclusions of the previous discussion
about whom managers represent have significant bearing on these
two questions. If, as the Delaware Supreme Court noted in Unocal,
target managers may protect the interests of employees, localities,
or "long-term investors," 11 6 then target managers have unlimited
justifications for blocking bids. If, on the other hand, target manag-
ers may protect only shareholders, then management power is much
more limited.
1. The Target Remains Independent
The negotiation model posits that target managers may unilat-
erally block a tender offer only if they possess confidential informa-
tion, the value of which would disappear if revealed to shareholders,
or if target managers made a reasonable but unsuccessful attempt to
115 Id.
116 Id.
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squeeze out a higher bid. Delaware Supreme Court opinions are
light years away from the model. Even if one assumes the primary
importance of shareholder interests, the court gives the target board
significant discretion in blocking a bid.
In Unocal, for example, the board listened to the advice of two
investment houses and determined after a nine-and-one-half-hour
meeting that a bid at a substantial premium over the market price
was "grossly inadequate."' 1 7 The advisers presented the board with
two arguments: First, the company's liquidation value exceeded
both the market value of its stock and the value of the bid, and, sec-
ond, similar recent acquisitions in the oil and gas industry had gen-
erated higher target prices. 118 The first claim is at best simply
inaccurate, ignoring that the current market value of a company's
stock partly reflects its liquidation value. At worst, it indicates that
the existing managers are breaching their fiduciary duty to their
shareholders by not liquidating the undervalued company. The sec-
ond claim, if true, is indirect evidence that other bidders may pay
more, but without more specific information that other bidders will
appear in the near future, such evidence is insufficient to justify
completely blocking an existing offer. Target managers can usually
find such accommodating advice, and they are quite willing to pay
for it.'19
The following Delaware Supreme Court case involving a suc-
cessful defense to a threatened tender offer is Polk v. Good.120 In
Polk, Texaco's directors thwarted a threatened tender offer by the
Bass brothers by repurchasing the Bass's holdings at a slight pre-
117 Id. at 950. Five days after the tender offer commenced, the Unocal board con-
vened to consider the bidder's price of $54 per share. Peter Sachs (on behalf of
Goldman Sachs & Co.) advised the board that the minimum cash value realizable upon
an orderly liquidation of all of the company's assets would exceed $60 per share. Uno-
cal stock traded for $49.75 the day before the offer began. Id.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.) (target
board's reliance on financial adviser's advice disallowed where adviser would lose
$75,000 bonus if it advised board that offer was fair, and offeror displaced existing
board as a result), prob. juri. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986). As if open-ended reliance on
friendly investment advisers was not enough, the Unocal court also dropped a gratuitous
footnote approving a seriously flawed study by another firm. 493 A.2d at 956 n.1 1; see
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101 (1979). Lipton's study
found that the stock of target companies that successfully defeat tender offers usually
sells at prices higher than the tender offer price. This study stands alone in its conclu-
sions; all serious study by academics is to the contrary. See, e.g., Bradley, Desai & Kim,
The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183, 189-98 (1983) (if target
management defeats tender offer and no subsequent offer arises within two years, stock
price, after temporary up-surge in price around announcement of tender offer, returns
to pre-offer level within two years).
120 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
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mium over the market price. 121 Texaco paid half in cash, and the
other half in voting preferred stock, which the Bass brothers agreed
to vote in proportions matching the votes cast by all other Texaco
common shareholders.' 22 The ensuing derivative suit was settled
for attorney fees (which were substantial) and legal expenses,
largely because any further prosecution would have been futile. 123
The court affirmed the chancellor's approval of the settlement terms
and found that the Texaco board was likely to survive any challenge
under Unocal's modified business judgment rule. 24 The court
noted that ten of the thirteen directors to approve the repurchase
were independent, outside directors, and that the Bass brothers
posed an "immediate disruptive effect" and a "potential long-term
threat" to Texaco and its shareholders. 125
The "immediate effect" to which the court alluded was the
threat to Texaco's ongoing attempt to buy Getty Oil. Rumors in the
financial press tied the Bass brothers to Pennzoil, Texaco's main ri-
val in the Getty Oil acquisition, and hinted that the Bass brothers, if
they acquired a controlling position in Texaco, would act to divest
Getty.126 The court found that the Texaco board believed itself
"vulnerable in warding off a hostile shareholder group whose ac-
tions might be contrary to the best interests of a majority of the
company's stockholders."' 127 The court never explained what it saw
as a "potential long-term threat."
It is hard to imagine weaker reasons for paying greenmail.
First, the court was content to let the Texaco board justify its posi-
tion by reference to unsubstantiated "rumors." Second, the Bass
brothers' willingness to pay a premium for Texaco shares in order
to divest Getty Oil from Texaco may have indicated that the Getty
Oil acquisition was against the best interests of Texaco sharehold-
ers, not the reverse. Finally, the payment of greenmail is best justi-
fied either by the existence of valuable inside information or by an
attempt to stall one bidder in an effort to attract other higher bid-
ders. Texaco offered neither justification. 128
121 Id. at 534.
122 Id. at 535.
123 When the suit was initially brought, the Bass brothers had agreed to vote their
preferred stock according to the directions of the Texaco board. Once this agreement
had been modified into the one noted in the text, the plaintiffs' lawyer concluded that
additional relief was unlikely. The settlement payment for attorney fees was a whopping
$700,000. Id.
124 Id. at 537.
125 Id.
126 Wall St.J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 6, col. 4; Wall St.J., Mar. 7, 1984, at 3, col. 3.
127 Polk, 507 A.2d at 533-34.
128 The argument that the pending Getty Oil acquisition created significant inside
information was apparently not made.
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Polk was a disappointment because it followed on the heels of a
more promising case, Moran v. Household International, Inc.129 In Mo-
ran, the court considered the merits of a stock purchase rights plan
adopted by the Household board to prepare for future tender of-
fers. Either the announcement of a tender offer for thirty percent of
the company's shares or the acquisition (either through private or
open market purchases) of a twenty-percent block of stock triggered
the rights. 130 Household could redeem the rights for fifty cents a
share if vested by a tender offer, but not if vested by open market
purchases.131
A negotiation model characterizes the tender offer portion of
the rights plan as a mechanism that empowers target managers to
bargain on behalf of shareholders during tender offers, particularly
partial tender offers. Thus the tender offer portion of such a plan is
not necessarily illegitimate, 3 2 and evaluation of the conduct of tar-
get managers must be postponed until an actual tender offer.' 3 3 The
129 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
130 Id. at 1348.
131 Id. at 1349.
132 Oesterle, supra note 9, at 67-68. The portion of the plan relating to private and
open market purchases, however, is more difficult to justify. The language in Moran
implies that the target board cannot withdraw or otherwise redeem the rights to facili-
tate an open market purchase of 20% or more of the stock even if the board determines
that such acquisitions are in the company's best interests. 500 A.2d at 1349, 1354. In
essence, the provision forces even friendly suitors to employ statutory merger or asset
sale forms of acquisition. Whether poison pills should affect privately negotiated acqui-
sitions is a complex and troublesome question. On the one hand, because normal open
market purchases do not carry the same potential for shareholder coercion as partial
tender offers, see supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text, such a provision may concen-
trate unnecessary power in the board.
In most cases the bidder does not inform market participants that they had better
sell or suffer the back-end price. Indeed, an acquiror is motivated to keep the subject of
an acquisition quiet as long as possible. On the other hand, an adroit bidder could
choose to disclose its intent to buy control, structuring the offer to pay a premium to a
limited number of shareholders on a first-come, first-serve basis. See Wellman v. Dickin-
son, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (private offers to several potential purchasers
with one-hour deadline and threats of "fleeting" premium), af'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). The threat mirrors the threat implicit in a
traditional tender offer, those who do not sell are threatened with a lower back-end
price. To the extent that these kinds of privately negotiated or open market purchases
are not classified as tender offers, a matter much in dispute, a poison pill plan legiti-
mately could provide a vehicle for target shareholder collusion in response. Because
most market acquisition "triggers" are broadly drafted to include all market purchases,
even those without any coercive incentives to sell, the triggers are overbroad. See And6,
Unconventional Offers Under the Williams Act: The Case forJudicial Restraint, I1J. CORP. L. 499
(1986). The Williams Act protects those responding to a tender offer that has mandated
disclosure and rules for equal treatment (particularly the pro rata rule on oversubscrip-
tions). These protections do not exist for those selling in privately negotiated or open
market transactions. Arguably a poison pill plan triggered by private acquisitions may
empower target managers to provide target shareholders some protection in private or
open market acquisitions that approximates that provided by the Williams Act.
133 Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill.) (interpreting
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Moran court seemed to agree with this view:
While we conclude for present purposes that the Household
Directors are protected by the business judgment rule, that does
not end the matter. The ultimate response to an actual takeover
bid must be judged by the Directors' actions at that time, and
nothing we say here relieves them of their basic fundamental du-
ties to the corporation and its stockholders 134
In Polk, however, the court had an opportunity to evaluate target
managers' response to a specific tender offer threat, and under the
Unocal standard, found no impropriety. Polk effectively closed the
door left open by Moran, and simply returned to Unocal's basic
message: In single bidder cases, target managers have significant
leeway. 135
The Revlon 13 6 case, the last case of the period (other aspects of
Delaware law), aft'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.),prob.juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986), is an
example of a court evaluating the use of a poison pill plan. See supra text accompanying
notes 77-83.
134 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 (citations omitted).
135 A recent and similarly troublesome case is Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. CBS, 627
F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ga. 1985). In Turner, CBS made an exchange offer of notes for com-
mon stock as part of its defense to a tender offer by Turner. The notes contained restric-
tive covenants that prohibited CBS from incurring any additional debt or from selling
any major assets without the approval of a majority of its "independent" directors, a
carefully defined group of nonemployee directors with the core on its current board. Id.
at 904. The note covenants would seriously jeopardize Turner's junk-bond financing
unless they were waived. Although there was no opprobrium in creating the covenants,
the board's subsequent refusal to honor Turner's request and waive the covenants de-
served closer scrutiny. The board's refusal to waive the covenants did not constitute a
gamble that could have induced Turner or another bidder to pay more, but was an abso-
lute defense to the Turner offer. The board relied on the opinion of an investment
house (the same adviser that had earlier proposed CBS's recapitalization scheme to
"mak[e] it less attractive as a takeover prospect," id. at 905) that the Turner/CBS
merger would create a failing enterprise: The new entity, said the advisers, would carry
too much debt for its income flow; the new notes that existing CBS shareholders would
receive in exchange for their stock would trade at well below face value; and numerous
affiliates would disassociate themselves from the new enterprise. Id. at 906.
Turner's tender offer was not partial, but was an any-or-all offer carrying a mini-
mum requirement. Thus the coercive aspect of a true partial tender offer was largely
absent. Moreover, the CBS board could have easily disseminated to its shareholders the
information on the potential unattractiveness of the new notes. The opinion therefore
offers no reason why the CBS shareholders could not have decided the offer's merits for
themselves. The court, however, relied heavily on the traditional business judgment
rule, and denied Turner's request for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 908-10.
The only significant case to hold against target managers in their total defense
against a single bidder is Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984)
(interpreting New York law). The target board created an Employee Stock Option Plan
and Trust and funded it with target stock at no cost to employees, making it more diffi-
cult for a hostile bidder to obtain control. The court held that the target managers
breached their fiduciary duty by establishing the plan "solely as a tool of management
self-perpetuation." Id. at 266.
136 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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which will be discussed in detail below 37), illustrates a target
board's legitimate decision to delay an existing tender offer. During
the offer, the board learned from an investment house that the bid-
der could turn a profit of from fifteen to twenty-five dollars per
share if it acquired the target at the existing price and broke it up. 138
In other words, there was substantial give in the bidder's price. The
target created a note purchase rights plan and executed a defensive
share repurchase program (exchanging stock for notes and pre-
ferred stock) to stall the sale. These tactics drove the bidder's price
up by over ten dollars per share before a competing bidder entered
the contest and drove the price up even further.'3 9 In the end
neither tactic stood in the way of the ultimate acquisition.
The Delaware Supreme Court may soon have an opportunity to
consider another case involving a complete defense. In AC Acquisi-
tions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 140 decided in the Court of Chan-
cery, the target used a front-end loaded self-tender offer to block a
nonfront-end loaded two-tier tender offer. The outside bidder of-
fered $56 per share for fifty-one percent of the outstanding shares,
promising to pay the same price in a close-out merger.' 4 1 The tar-
get managers countered with an offer to buy sixty-five percent of the
outstanding shares for $60 per share. 142 The parties disagreed over
the back-end value of the remaining stock after a successful self-
tender offer; estimates ranged from $22 to $52.143
The court enjoined the self-tender offer, which it labeled "coer-
cive," after reasoning that it gave shareholders no choice but to re-
ject the outside bid. 144 The target board, under the pretext of
providing shareholders with a choice, had erected a complete block
to the outside bidder. The court noted correctly that the front-end
loaded self-tender offer provided no choice at all, and struck it
down. Could the target board have saved the plan by arguing that it
improved the position of target shareholders? The board claimed
that the self-tender offer gave shareholders a substantial cash distri-
bution at capital gains rates and permitted a continuing equity par-
ticipation in the growth of a better leveraged company. These
benefits, the board argued, made the plan equivalent in value to the
137 See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
138 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
139 Id. at 177-78. After Revlon's note purchase rights plan and defensive share re-
purchase program failed to discourage Pantry Pride (the first bidder), Revlon manage-
ment solicited a friendly bid from Forstmann Little & Co. After Forstmann entered the
auction, the high bid rose by another four dollars. Id. at 178.
140 [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,942 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 1986).
141 Id. at 94,597-98.
142 Id. at 94,599.
143 Id. at 94,601.
144 Id. at 94,601-02.
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outside offer. 145 The board's claims are dubious; modem finance
theory suggests that recapitalization rarely creates value. 146 The
court was also suspicious; it noted that the board had considered a
similar program of recapitalization earlier in the year, valuing the
program at between $43 and $47 per share. 147
On the other hand, the target board could have argued, as it did
not, that the self-tender offer represented a negotiating tactic in-
tended to coax a higher bid from the outsider. Indeed, the board,
after rejecting the $56 offer, agreed to provide the bidder with non-
public information, 148 and representatives of both parties met in
further unsuccessful efforts to discuss a purchase price. 149 If the
board intended the block as a negotiating ploy, then the court
should have required that the board justify the ploy as reasonable
under the circumstances. Because the outside bid was not front-end
loaded, however, there was no demonstrated disadvantage in al-
lowing shareholders to decide for themselves whether to tender.
Recognizing this, the court suggested that the board should have
delayed the self-tender offer until the shareholders had a chance to
accept the outside bid. 150 The board could have disseminated any
information pertaining to the appropriateness of the price. Absent
a demonstration that shareholders could not decide autonomously
to accept the offer, the injunction was proper.
2. The Target Favors One Bidder over Another
When more than one bidder is involved, the negotiation model
suggests that the target may temporarily block one bidder to en-
courage others' 5 ' or may neutralize the advantage that a partial
tender offer has over an any-or-all offer.152 The target, however,
rarely should completely paralyze one of the participants, because
this could short circuit the escalation of competing bids. 153 One
could also argue that target managers should intervene when they
145 Id. at 94,595, 94,601.
146 E.g., W. KLEIN &J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 272-95 (2d ed.
1986).
147 AC Acquisitions, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 94,596.
148 Id. at 94,598.
149 Id. at 94,599.
150 Id. at 94,602.
151 Earlier I concluded that defenses are "legitimate only if, first, they disadvantage
all existing bidders to give target managers time to find other bidders, and second, they
are reversible so that once an auction is established, the bidding is unaffected by the
tactic." Oesterle, supra note 9, at 93.
152 Indeed, the coercive effect of partial or two-tiered tender offers is the most com-
pelling justification for the role of target manager as negotiator. See id. at 56-63; supra
notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
153 When the target permanently disables one of the bidders, there is a risk that
management has acted in its own self-interest. See Oesterle, supra note 9, at 92.
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are convinced that one bidder's promises have exceeded its financial
resources. A simple disclosure by the target to its shareholders of
the financial inadequacies of one of the participants should usually
provide the necessary protection.1 54 The only likely case in which a
target board should terminate bidding arises when the target board
is convinced that normal bidding is over and that only a lock-up op-
tion, for example, can elicit any higher bid. Surprisingly, in Revlon
the Delaware Supreme Court seems to have accepted the negotia-
tion model on this point, for it rejected Revlon management's at-
tempts to intervene in the bidding process.1 55
In Revlon the court demonstrated that the modified business
judgment rule first announced in Unocal had teeth. Revlon found
itself the subject of a bidding war between Pantry Pride and Forst-
mann. Pantry Pride boldly announced that it would top any Forst-
mann offer. Forstmann approached the Revlon board with an offer
exceeding Pantry Pride's. But Forstmann's offer included a contin-
gency; Forstmann demanded both a lock-up option on some of Rev-
lon's prime assets and a no-shop clause. Under the option, if
Forstmann acquired over forty percent of Revlon's shares, Forst-
mann had the right to purchase over $700 million of Revlon assets
for $525 million. The no-shop clause effectively prohibited the Rev-
lon board from negotiating with anyone other than Forstmann, be-
cause Pantry Pride could not afford to pay a premium price only to
suffer a bargain sale. The Revlon board granted both of Forst-
mann's requests and thus ended the contest.' 56
The court enjoined the lock-up option and the no-shop clause,
finding that they were "measures which end[ed] an active auction
and foreclose[d] further bidding . .. to the shareholders' detri-
ment."'157 Thus the case, in spirit, adopts the negotiation model for
auction contests. Ironically, Revlon may be the rare case in which a
lock-up is a rational gamble for the target managers.' 58 Pantry
Pride was publicly committed to beat by a hair any additional Forst-
154 Thus, target managers who block one bidder on the grounds that the bidder is
financially unstable should be required to show that public disclosure of this opinion was
not a sufficient cure.
155 The Delaware Supreme Court's reversal was influenced heavily by the Second
Circuit opinion in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986) (interpreting New York law). In Hanson, the Second Circuit granted a preliminary
injunction against a lock-up option on substantial target company assets, holding that
the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of proving that the target board had breached its duty
of care both by underpricing the option and by using it to foreclose additional bidding.
Id. at 275, 282-83.
156 For a more detailed recounting of the facts, see Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176-79.
157 Id. at 183.
158 In fairness to the court, however, the numerous less meritorious arguments
urged by the defendant's lawyers may have obscured the true nature of the bargaining
gamble.
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mann offer, and Forstmann looked to have one last, slightly sweeter
offer to make. Why make the offer if Pantry Pride will beat it? If
Forstmann never makes its last offer, then Pantry Pride need not
increase its pending offer to win the contest. One could thus argue
that a potentially higher price is lost unless the Revlon board inter-
venes and encourages Forstmann to make its final offer.
This argument has two problems. First, the Revlon board must
be convinced both that Forstmann has just one more bid and that
Forstmann will not make it without encouragement. If Forstmann
can run an effective bluff, the Revlon shareholders lose. Target
managers might well make more incorrect than correct decisions in
such situations. Second, why should Forstmann need encourage-
ment to make its final offer? Even if Revlon provides no guarantees,
Forstmann, already outbid, loses nothing by being outbid at its final
position; there is also the chance that Pantry Pride is bluffing and
that it could not top Forstmann's last bid. Thus, Forstmann has
nothing to lose, and might have something to gain, by making its
last bid, even without encouragement from Revlon.
The Delaware court noted that lock-up options and no-shop
clauses may be more justified when used to encourage a bidder to
enter an auction than when used to terminate an auction. 159 The
court has a point. The risk that a potential bidder will choose not to
enter the bidding absent encouragement is greater than the risk that
an existing bidder will not increase its offer, because the potential
entrant may not have incurred the substantial preparatory costs re-
quired to make a sound financial decision; an existing bidder, how-
ever, has already incurred these costs. A lock-up option could
persuade the potential bidder to incur these preparatory costs. Nev-
ertheless the use of lock-ups to encourage entry (and final) bids is
problematic. Once a bidder is successfully wooed with lock-up op-
tions, the bidding ends. The target must be convinced not only that
the favored potential entrant will not enter the bidding without en-
couragement, but that no other bidder will appear as well. Perhaps
potential bidders may too often falsely play the reluctant bidder to
gain a clear advantage through a lock-up. In addition, a potential
bidder incurs expense by acquiring the information necessary to so-
licit a lock-up option. No target will grant the lock-up without assur-
ance on price, and the potential entrant must incur significant costs
just to calculate that price. Finally, targets have better means to en-
159 Such options might entice other bidders to enter a control contest, creating an
auction for the company and maximizing shareholder profit. Because of current eco-
nomic conditions in the takeover market, a "white knight" like Forstmann might only
enter the bidding if it receives some form of compensation to cover the risks and costs
involved.
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courage potential entrants. For example, a target could agree to
guarantee a potential entrant a minimum profit even if it loses the
bidding war. Such a guarantee could take the form of a "leg-up"
agreement, in which the target agrees to sell the potential entrant a
block of stock at or slightly below market price, conditioned on the
entrant making a set tender offer. If the entrant loses the subse-
quent bidding contest, it cashes in its target stock at a profit, thereby
offsetting preparatory costs.
The Revlon court also addressed the legality of Revlon's note
purchase rights plan. Revlon adopted a variant of the common
share purchase rights plan, substituting contingent rights to buy
notes for contingent rights to buy stock. The board could redeem
the rights prior to vesting for a nominal amount. Both bidders rec-
ognized that, for their offers to succeed, Revlon would have to re-
deem these rights. Thus, the board could have blocked either offer
by agreeing to redeem the rights for only one of the bidders. The
board claimed instead that it would redeem the rights for any bidder
that made an offer of over $56 per share. 160 Thus, the board, while
using the threat of not redeeming the rights to escalate the bidding,
did not favor one bidder over another. 161 The court held that the
plan itself was reasonably created and that the board used the plan
in the best interests of the Revlon shareholders. 162
Although approaching the negotiation model, the Revlon case
falls short in two ways. The first is a serious limitation in theory; the
second is a political weakness that the Delaware legislature has ex-
ploited. The major theoretical shortcoming of the Revlon case de-
rives from its suggestion that Unocal survives largely intact. 163 The
Revlon court carefully limited its analysis to auctions and other situa-
tions in which target managers recognize the inevitability of the
company's sale.'6 In single bidder cases, target managers can ap-
parently still summon a variety of arguments to justify a decision to
"maintain the corporate enterprise,"' 165 including the claim that the
"intrinsic value" of a company's stock exceeds a forty-percent pre-
160 This matched Forstmann's bid at the time. Later, the board apparently upped
the lower limit to $57.25 per share. Id. at 181.
161 The court noted that "[flar from being a 'show-stopper,' as the plaintiffs had
contended in Moran, the [rights] measure spurred the bidding to new heights, a proper
result of its implementation. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354, 1356-67." Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 181.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 180-81.
164 The court stated, "The duty of the board had thus changed from the preserva-
tion of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale
for the stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities
under the Unocal standards." Id. at 182.
165 Id.
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mium over its market price. 166 The court also may have retained
Unocal's broader list ofjustifications because of its disdain for "bust-
up" takeovers.' 67
Revlon's second shortcoming is more political than doctrinal.
The Delaware Supreme Court, following the lead of the Second Cir-
cuit, 16 8 appears to hold that the Revlon board violated the duty of
care, not the duty of loyalty, to shareholders when it agreed to the
lock-up option and the no-shop clause.' 69 Yet the holding is incon-
gruous; the court tightened its duty of care standard precisely be-
cause of the threat of duty of loyalty violations.' 70 The state
legislature responded by passing a bill allowing Delaware corpora-
tions to eliminate the financial liability of their directors for duty of
care cases.' 7 ' The new bill will apparently reach allegations of the
Revlon type. Had Revlon rested on duty of loyalty grounds, the new
166 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
167 The court noted that once the sale of the company is certain, the directors' role
changes from that of chivalric "defenders of the corporate bastion" to that of "auction-
eers." Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
If a company is worth more sold in pieces than it is as a whole, then the board ought
to break it up; tender offerors therefore provide a service when they break up a company
that its prior managers stubbornly refused to liquidate. But the court apparently views
"bust-up" takeovers as somehow sleazy, akin to automobile stripping by car thieves.
The big difference between automobile stripping and "bust-up" takeovers, of course, is
that tender offerors do not steal their subjects. They are gambling that the break-up
process, with its transactions costs, will exceed the price they paid for the stock.
168 Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)
(interpreting New York law to apply duty of care standard to directors' decision to grant
lock-up option); see supra note 155.
169 The opinion's language, although ambiguous, seems to apply the duty of care
standard: "No such defensive measure can be sustained when it represents a breach of
the directors' fundamental duty of care. In that context the board's action is not entitled
to the deference accorded it by the business judgment rule." Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185
(citation omitted).
170 See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) ("[The
purchase of shares with corporate funds . . . when a threat to control is involved [is
inherently dangerous]. The directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of inter-
est .... Hence .... the burden should be on the directors to justify such a purchase as
one primarily in the corporate interest.").
171 65 Del. Laws 289 (1986). The new law amends Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)
(1974) to add:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not elimi-
nate or limit the liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director's
duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders ....
The bill may lead to a similar statute that allows corporations to limit such liability
for themselves as well. Some of the literature supports this approach. See Scott, Corpora-
tion Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927
(1983). Scott suggests that the duty of care lawsuit is of "minor importance" because
-successful actions are exceedingly rare, and substantial recovery is still rarer." Id. at
936 & n.36 (citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATE-
MENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.06(e)(i) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982)).
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bill would not have applied. Passing a provision that would limit or
eliminate corporate liability for duty of loyalty cases would prove
politically very difficult, even in Delaware. It is difficult to under-
stand the court's reluctance to ground its holdings on straight duty
of loyalty investigations, and the Delaware legislature has exploited
this reticence.
III
MATCHING DOCTRINE WITH THEORY: SHOULD POISON
PILLS AND SHARK REPELLENT AMENDMENTS BE
ILLEGAL?
The most important implication of the negotiation model is
that courts should limit the scope of allowable defenses. Target
boards can only justify a total seige defense by showing the exist-
ence of valuable confidential information, and can only justify a
stalling defense by demonstrating that they reasonably believed that
higher-paying bidders would soon appear.
I have already urged courts to impose stiffer burdens of proof
upon target managers who employ defenses that are only infre-
quently justifiable. 172 In time, experience will add to our under-
standing of which defenses fall into this category. At present, I favor
including in this category any defenses erected by the target board
that pose substantially permanent blocks to any bidder. Such de-
fenses include those that the board itself cannot easily remove later.
If defenses conclusively block a sole bidder, or hinder one of two
bidders in order to effect a sale to the other, then courts should limit
the arguments advanced to justify board action and require that
boards prove the need for such defenses by clear and convincing
evidence. 173 Thus, most poison pills and most shark repellent
amendments that are absolute, giving no leeway for boards to re-
move them if a serious offer to buy the company arises, should fail.
Defenses intended to delay tender offers in order to coax a bet-
ter price from a bidder or to stimulate an auction should fare better.
The erection of such defenses is not itself a problem, but target
managers can misuse the defenses to secure or gain personal advan-
tages.' 74 Courts must therefore critically evaluate target boards' use
of powers from defensive plans.
One of the strongest residual criticisms against the use of any
defensive tactics by target managers focuses on the complexities and
external costs of the mechanisms required. 75 Defensive tactics with
172 See Oesterle, supra note 9, at 83-95.
173 My earlier piece provided a more complete explication of this idea. Id. at 86-94.
174 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
175 See Bebchuk, supra note 42.
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significant external costs, such as filing lawsuits in as many different
courts and on as many legal theories as possible,' 76 are cause for
alarm. Defenses so complicated that their details cannot be under-
stood by many shareholders are similarly troublesome. A particu-
larly important factor that can get lost in the maze of legal
documents is the ease with which target boards can remove any de-
fense erected. 177
The overriding feature of most poison pill plans and many
shark repellent amendments 78 is that they create onerous contin-
gencies that the target itself does not want triggered. This feature
causes the difficult enforcement problems noted earlier, 7 9 and
these enforcement problems-not the discriminatory nature of the
defenses or the lack of shareholder consent-provide the most pow-
erful criticism against their use. Triggered plans with flip-overs, for
example, present the court with the dilemma of either enforcing the
plan and leaving a locked-up 80 target or not enforcing the plan and
encouraging other bidders to ignore similar plans. Suits on the eve
of a triggering event force a court to evaluate whether the bargain-
ing is over or just beginning in assessing the reasonableness of the
target's continued resistance.
Discriminatory flip-in provisions alleviate one problem but cre-
ate another. A discriminatory flip-in provision, once triggered,
gives rightholders other than the triggering acquiror the right to
buy stock in the target at an outrageously low price. Once the flip-in
is triggered, the only injury is to the acquiror, because the other
shareholders enjoy the gains of diluting the value of his stock in the
target. No bidder would purposely trigger such a plan, hoping for
court nullification. Yet the gain to the target from a triggered flip-in
provision may be too tempting. Some target managers may be in-
duced to forego bargaining for a good price in favor of holding out
and trying to convince a court that a bidder has in fact triggered the
flip-in. Moreover, flip-in plans do not relieve the court of evaluating
176 SeeJarrell, supra note 27, at 174 ("The targets that defeat the takeover attempt by
vigorous litigation lose the entire takeover premium.").
177 The initial defensive exchange offer by Unocal, which answered one front-end
loaded partial tender offer by establishing a back-end loaded partial exchange offer, is a
classic example of such convolution. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950-51. In essence, the Unocal
board answered one prisoner's dilemma by creating another. Unocal offered an amount
in excess of the tender offer price -to all shareholders who had not tendered if the Mesa
tender offer succeeded. The board thus encouraged Unocal shareholders not to tender to
Mesa so as to get the higher back-end price, but if enough chose not to tender to Mesa,
the Mesa offer failed and the shareholders lost both the front-end premium and the
back-end premium. The Unocal board later removed the contingency. Id. at 951.
178 Some fair price amendments are an exception.
179 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
180 When the flip-over rights vest, the target cannot merge with any other entity.
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the quality of outstanding offers in suits prior to the triggering
event.
In sum, the use of contingencies that are designed not to be
triggered encourages strategic behavior by parties playing on judi-
cial sensibilities. Whetherjudges can chart a sensible course in this
maze is uncertain. A good deal of complexity and confusion could
be avoided if shareholders were entitled unequivocally to do directly
what they now must do indirectly. Shareholders should be able to
vest in the hands of an identified agent the exclusive right to tender
stock in the event of a tender offer for a specified percentage of the
stock. 181 The right not to tender even if the agent recommends it
could remain with the shareholders; shareholders are bound only by
the agent's decision that they should not tender. The agent would
then have the power to negotiate for the best price. To eliminate
the conflict of interest that now often obscures the judgment of tar-
get managers, the agent's compensation could be tied to the differ-
ence between the market price of the stock before a tender offer is
publicly announced and the blended tender offer price if the com-
pany is sold or the stock price of the target if the company remains
independent. Indeed, courts could and should evaluate the per-
formance of the negotiating agent in this kind of system under the
traditional robust version of the business judgment rule.
A step in this direction is the device, newly approved by the
New York Stock Exchange and awaiting SEC approval, 182 of creat-
ing two classes of voting stock. By placing the dominant class of
voting stock in the hands of a selected group of insiders, a corpora-
tion can, in essence, empower a subgroup to act as negotiating
agents for the remainder when confronted by an offer to purchase
the company. The system has definite advantages over the poison
pill plans and the shark repellent amendments in that there is no
erection of onerous contingencies based on control changes, but it
has its own disadvantages. The creation of two classes of voting
stock not only affects takeover situations but normal firm operations
as well. Those with concentrated voting power will also wield that
power in normal elections of directors and votes of shareholder res-
olutions. The optimal system would empower bargaining agents for
takeover contests and not create a spillover effect that rebalances
voting power in nontakeover situations.
181 See Oesterle, supra note 9, at 67.
182 See NYSE's Proposed Rule Changes on Disparate Voting Rights, [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1389 (Sept. 19, 1986).
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